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Game theory has been an effective tool to generate solutions for decision making in
fisheries involving multiple countries and fleets. Here, we use a coupled bio-economic
model based on a Baltic Sea dynamic multispecies food web model called BALMAR
and, we compare non-cooperative (NC) and cooperative game (grand coalition: GC)
solutions. Applications of game theory based on a food web model under climate
change have not been studied before and the present study aims to fill this gap in
the literature. The study focuses on the effects of climate variability on the biological,
harvest and economic output of the game models by examining two different climate
scenarios, a first scenario characterized by low temperature and high salinity and a
second scenario by high temperature and low salinity. Our results showed that in the
first scenario sprat spawning stock biomass (SSB) and harvest dropped dramatically
both in the NC and the GC cases whereas, herring and cod SSBs and harvests were
higher compared to a base scenario (BS) keeping temperature and salinity at mean
historical levels. In the second scenario, the sprat SSB and the harvest was higher for
both GC and NC cases while the cod and the herring SSBs and harvests were lower.
The total GC payoffs clearly outperformed the NC payoffs across all scenarios. Likewise,
the first and second scenario GC payoffs for countries were higher except for Poland.
The findings suggested the climate vulnerability of Baltic Sea multi-species fisheries and
these results would support future decision-making processes of Baltic Sea fisheries.
Keywords: Baltic Sea, fisheries, game theory, climate change, food web model
INTRODUCTION
Game theory has been an effective tool to generate solutions for decision making in many fields
(e.g., policy making, military methodologies, environmental and natural resource economics and
management) (Eatwell et al., 1989). In general, the nature of game theory is highly suited for
management problems in fisheries, as the fishers want to increase their economic profits from
their activity that generates positive and negative externalities for the resource users and non-
users (Bailey et al., 2010). One of the important management problems around the world is open
access use of the fisheries resources without cooperative agreement. Non-cooperation is quite
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common among fishing states. In particular, many conflicts arise
concerning fishing rights on highly migratory and range shifting
species (Pinsky et al., 2018), often as a response to climate
change (Perry et al., 2005; Pinsky et al., 2013). Cooperative
agreements provide resilience through time so that the states
can react flexibly to the impact of unexpected shifts in, e.g.,
biology, climate, and economy (FAO, 2016). Therefore, there is
a clear need to understand and predict the impacts of climate
change. Otherwise, disputes over cooperative agreements can
be inevitable (Miller et al., 2001; Sissener and Bjørndal, 2005).
One instrument to provide flexibility for such conflicts is side
payments that prevent the losses generated by the inequality
raised by these shifts (induced mainly by climate change) (Miller
and Munro, 2004). Previously, single-species game theoretic
studies (e.g., Diekert et al., 2010; Bjørndal and Lindroos, 2012;
Kulmala et al., 2013) and multispecies game theoretic models
have been utilized for various fisheries management issues
concerning climatic and other environmental variations in the
literature (Nieminen et al., 2012, 2016).
Baltic Sea fisheries constitute prime examples of common pool
fisheries managed by European Union Common Fisheries Policy
(EU-CFP). The EU fishing nations in the Baltic Sea jointly agree
on an annual total allowable catch (TAC) for each commercially
important stock. The TACs are shared among participating
nations considering the relative stability principle that determines
harvest quotas based on historical catch records of the EU
member states whereas, the nationwide TAC is shared among
fishermen according to country specific rules (Nieminen et al.,
2016). Denmark, Poland, and Sweden have been the dominant
cod (Gadus morhua callarias) fishing nations in the Baltic Sea for
the last two decades. These countries are also actively involved
in fishing sprat (Sprattus sprattus) and herring (Clupea harengus
membras) that are key prey for the Eastern Baltic cod. During the
past decades the Baltic Sea has experienced pronounced changes
in hydrographic conditions, notably a marked long-term increase
in temperature, decrease in salinity and deep-water oxygen
concentrations (Meier, 2006; Neumann, 2010), as well increased
eutrophication causing widespread algae blooms (Mackenzie
et al., 2007; Markus Meier et al., 2011; Neumann et al., 2012).
These abiotic changes have led to large-scale ecosystem changes,
i.e., regime shifts, occurring in the late 1980s (Möllmann et al.,
2009; Casini et al., 2012; Blenckner et al., 2015) that particularly
affected the recruitment of the commercially important species,
cod, sprat, and herring (Cardinale et al., 2009; Margonski et al.,
2010; Thøgersen et al., 2015).
In the literature there are few applications of game theory
in different environmental variation problems. For example,
management implications of sprat, herring, and cod in the
Eastern Baltic Sea under changing climate scenarios were
studied by Thøgersen et al. (2015). The authors represented the
bioeconomic output of three management scenarios based on
a multi-species multi-fleet bioeconomic model. They concluded
that the management plan in practice for cod have negative
impact on the cod abundance and on the economic gains of
fishermen and, this negativity can be eradicated by a reduction
in fishing mortality. In another study, Wang and Ewald (2010)
highlighted the positive output for competing species survival
in a prey-predator system under cooperative management with
climate variation whereas, non-cooperation resulted in stock
collapse. Brandt and Kronbak (2010) represented the changes
in stability of fishery agreements under different scenarios. The
authors investigated the stability of fishery agreements under
climate uncertainty based on an age-structured bioeconomic
model and concluded that climate change has negative impact on
the payoffs by decreasing the likelihood of establishment of stable
cooperative agreements. Nieminen et al. (2012) evaluated Baltic
sprat, herring, and cod fisheries for changing salinity scenarios
including a species interaction function into a bioeconomic
model. They found that lower fishing mortality would result in
higher economic input whereas, under a high salinity scenario,
cod stock achieved better levels of recruitment. Nieminen et al.
(2016) investigated a multispecies partition function game among
three asymmetric nations bordering the Baltic Sea. They showed
that the full cooperation among three nations can be stabilized
if the dominant nation compensates the other nations. They also
presented higher revenue under cooperation if the cod biomass
declined under climate change.
In this study, we applied a novel multi-species game theory
approach for Baltic Sea fisheries based on a food web model to
investigate and compare non-cooperative (NC) and cooperative
game (grand coalition: GC) solutions under different climate
scenarios. Our study focus on the effects of climate variability
on the biological, harvest, and economic output of the NC and
GC approaches by examining two different climate scenarios
representing favorable and unfavorable temperature and salinity
conditions for the stock status of cod, sprat and herring compared
to a base scenario (BS) with climate conditions maintained
unchanged at their mean historical levels. To assess the sensitivity
of the model we used varying economic parameters including
cost, price and discount rate.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Biological Model: Setup and Validation
We established the bioeconomic models based on the previously
developed Baltic Sea food-web model called BALMAR
(Lindegren et al., 2009; Supplementary Figure S1). BALMAR
represents the food web dynamics of sprat, herring and cod
(the three ecologically and commercially most important species
in the Central Baltic Sea) and accounts for their pair-wise
species interactions, as well as climate and fishing impacts on
their recruitment and survival. This statistical model is based
on a theoretical approach for modeling long-term population
dynamics (Ives et al., 2003) and is given by:
X(t) = BX(t − 1)+ CU(t − y)+ E(t) (1)
Y(t) = ZX(t)+ V(t) (2)
where X are spawning stock biomass (SSB) values of cod, sprat
and herring derived from a multi-species fish stock assessment
model (ICES, 1996) at time t and t − 1, respectively, and B is
a 3 × 3 matrix of pair-wise species interaction parameters. The
covariate vector U contains time-series of estimated mean annual
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fishing mortalities (F) and a number of selected environmental
variables known to affect recruitment of cod, sprat, and herring,
respectively (Köster et al., 2003, 2005; Nissling, 2004; Möllmann
et al., 2005; Dickmann et al., 2007). These include time series of
summer bottom (80–100 m) salinity, spring surface (0–10 m)
temperature and the log(abundance) of the key zooplankton
prey (Pseudocalanus acuspes) for herring (Möllmann et al.,
2005). The data was provided by the ICES/HELCOM Working
Group on Integrated Assessments of the Baltic Sea (ICES, 2008).
The effect of the fishing and environmental variables on each
species are represented by the diagonal parameters in the matrix
(C). Regression parameters were found by maximum likelihood
estimation using a Kalman filter (Harvey, 1989). E is the process
error, V is the observation error of the covariance matrix of the
normal random variable. Y is the true observed state. The fitted
model parameters captured accurately the known mechanisms
of species interactions (Supplementary Figure S1), including
density-dependence, competition between sprat and herring and
cod predation on both sprat and herring (Köster and Möllmann,
2000; Neuenfeldt and Köster, 2000; Möllmann et al., 2005).
Furthermore, the model parameters also illustrate the negative
effect of fishing and the positive effect of the environmental
variables including temperature, salinity, and zooplankton on
sprat, cod, and herring, respectively (MacKenzie and Köster,
2004; Köster et al., 2005; Möllmann et al., 2005).
A number of diagnostics were applied to assess whether
the final food-web model (Supplementary Figure S1)
gave a reasonable description of the food-web dynamics
(Supplementary Figure S2). The assumption of normality of
the error terms is supported by an analysis of the residuals
(Supplementary Figure S3). A partial autocorrelation analysis
of the residuals further indicates that the model errors were
independent for all species and lags. Finally, a stability analysis
of the final parameters of the community matrix, B reveal a
dominant eigenvalue below one (λ1 = 0.93), indicating a stable
food-web model dynamic. The predictive capabilities of the
food-web model was validated by a sequential refitting procedure
where the model was initially fitted to only the first 10 years
of the data set and then refitted on a yearly basis, producing a
prediction for each consecutive year. The predicted values and
associated 95% prediction intervals were compared with the
observed values to assess the predictive accuracy of the model.
Additionally, the food-web dynamics was simulated using only
the first-year values as initial conditions. This procedure is
fundamentally different from a simple fit to the data, as the
observed values from the second year onward are not used in
forward predictions. Simulations were run 1,000 times with
random process noise added at each time step. Mean values
and a 95% confidence interval of the hindcast predictions were
computed. To assess the relative contribution of environmental
and species interactions in affecting the food-web dynamics,
an additional hindcast simulation was performed using a
simpler single-species model fitted only to fishing mortalities
and biomasses of each individual species separately. Both the
sequential refitting and the simulated dynamics demonstrated a
distinct ability to “recreate the past” dynamics of cod, herring
and sprat (Supplementary Figure S4). The hindcast simulations
without accounting for environmental forcing and species
interactions, however, did not at all explain nor recreate the past
dynamics of the three species, especially in the case of cod and
sprat (Supplementary Figure S1). Consequently, the food-web
model including both species interactions and climate effects was
used in the original publication by Lindegren et al. (2009) and in
our bio-economic simulations.
Economic Model
To explore game theoretic scenarios, we investigated two strategic
interactions between players, here represented by different fishing
fleets (rather than individual vessels) as agents. The first is NC
interactions where each fleet take its fishing decision by itself and
the second is a fully cooperative (grand coalition: GC) interaction
where all fleets cooperate by a binding agreement. Three fishing
states, Denmark, Poland, and Sweden were considered where
each state has its own pelagic fleet for sprat and herring, as
well as a demersal fleet for cod. Hence, a total of six fishing
fleets were considered for the models. In the NC games, the
six fleets act independently and exploit the sprat, herring, and
cod stocks whereas, in the GC game, the fleets act depending
on a binding agreement. Additionally, the catch of these three
dominant fishing nations amount to 70% of the total catch.
Consequently, we focused on these three states as they also
historically exploit the resource dominantly.
The economic parameters of the model were obtained from
the literature. Following Nieminen et al. (2016), the species’
prices, pi,j, are constant over time and asymmetrical for the
countries. Here, i is country and j is the species, discount rates
for each country is constant over time, ri, were applied from
Nieminen et al. (2016) and ci is the cost parameters (constant
over time) for each species. In our model, use of dynamic prices
and costs would be useful to evaluate our case study closer to the
real-life case; however, such dynamic cost and price taking into
account stock size are to our knowledge missing for all nations
and species except for the Danish cod fishery (Röckmann et al.,
2008). So that, we utilized the constant cost and price parameters
over time. In our model, the costs are only depended on fishing
mortalities (Table 1). All models were simulated in R Program
(R Core Team, 2019).
Harvest costs were calculated depending on the following
equational relationships. Ei,j is the effort in number of fishing
days, fi,j is the fishing mortality per fleet per species and qj is the
catchability parameter of the species.
Ei,j(t) = fi,j(t)qj (3)
Harvest per species and per fleet can be derived by
hi,j(t) = qjEi,j(t)Xj(t) (4)
The cost function can be rewritten as
Ci,j (t) = ci × fi,j (t) (5)
where ci is the cost parameter for species. Here, the costs
are depended on fishing mortalities and cost parameters
as well as effort.
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TABLE 1 | The economic parameters used in the coupled bio-economic model in terms of market prices, fishing costs, and catchability coefficients for each country and
target species.
Price Harvesting Discount
Country Species (€/kg) cost (€/day) rate Catchability coefficient
Denmark Sprat 0.25 562.41 0.00000471153
Herring 0.25 2819.21 0.07 0.000043382–0.00000471153
Cod 1.81 3.888
Poland Sprat 0.19 562.41 0.00000471153
Herring 0.19 2819.21 0.106 0.000043382–0.00000471153
Cod 0.95 2.760
Sweden Sprat 0.25 562.41 0.0000047115
Herring 0.19 2819.21 0.082 0.000043382–0.00000471153
Cod 1.47 4.512
1Cost Parameters for human consumption for sprat and herring; 2Catchability coefficient for human consumption herring; 3Catchability coefficient for fodder
herring and sprat.
In the NC case, each country maximizes its long-term
profits independently. Term pii,j denotes the sum of discounted
profits of each country i, from each species j across the years
t. The countries maximize their economic benefits according
to the formula below and, the profit maximization formula
was subjected to the population dynamics explained in the
biological part of the model above. We used a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium where each player can observe the play of the
others in the game.
When i denotes the fleets i = 1,3 and j denotes for species j = 1,3
and the objective function of the NC game for each country, i, is
piNC (i) = maxfi,j
∑80
t=1
pi,jhi,j (t)− ci,jEi,j(t)
(1+ r)t−1 (6)
The objective function of the GC is maximizing the joint
discounted profit across countries and species as follows:
piGC = maxfi,j
∑80
t=1
∑3
i=1
pi,jhi,j(t)− ci,jEi,j(t)
(1+ r)t−1 (7)
Climate Scenarios
For both the NC and GC cases, we forced the BALMAR
food-web model with three climate scenarios reflecting
time periods with different hydrographic conditions highly
favorable or unfavorable for recruitment of cod, herring and
sprat (Supplementary Figure S2), namely: (i) a BS keeping
temperature and salinity at mean historical levels (1975–2010),
(ii) a first scenario (S1) keeping temperature and salinity at
the mean levels observed prior to the regime shift in the 1980s
(1975–1980), a period with low temperatures and high salinities
favorable for cod and herring, (iii) a second scenario (S2) keeping
temperature and salinity at the mean levels observed after the
regime shift (1990–1995), a period with high temperatures and
low salinities favoring sprat recruitment. Here, we mainly aimed
to see how NC or GC behavior was impacted by the changes in
climate variables, temperature and salinity by comparing the pre-
and post-regime shift scenario relative to the BS in terms of SSB,
yield and revenue. In order to account for ecological uncertainty
(arising from the food web model), we performed multiple
(N = 100) stochastic simulations for each scenario by introducing
multivariate random errors into the food web model for each
realization (see Eq. 1). Furthermore, we performed a sensitivity
analysis on the economic parameters by varying the discount
rates, cost and price for all cases.We decided to leave out some
of the results regarding sensitivity tests for the deterministic and
stochastic simulations to reduce the length and complexity of the
paper. However, we introduced Supplementary Text and figures
that show these results (Supplementary Figures S6–S24).
RESULTS
Biological and Harvest Outputs
In the first scenario, sprat SSB dropped dramatically both in the
NC and the GC cases whereas, herring and cod stocks were higher
compared to the BS (Figure 1). Furthermore, the herring SSB is
the only one that was greater in the GC compared to the NC.
In the second scenario, sprat SSB was higher for both GC and
NC cases while cod and the herring were lower compared to
the BS (Figure 1).
In the first scenario, the NC and the GC harvest changes
were highest for Poland, while the smallest changes in the NC
and the GC were observed for Sweden. In the first scenario, the
GC harvests of Denmark and Sweden were higher than their
NC harvests, in contrast to Poland that got significantly higher
harvest in the GC compared to the NC. In the second scenario,
the GC harvest for Poland solely surpassed the NC harvest.
Moreover, second scenario GC harvest changes of Denmark and
Sweden stayed below the NC harvest (Figure 2).
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FIGURE 1 | Relative changes in the stock spawning biomasses of the species in the non-cooperative (NC) and the grand coalition (GC) games under each climate
scenario [i.e., low temperature/high salinity (S1); high temperature/low salinity (S2)], relative to the base scenario (temperature and salinity at mean observed levels).
In the first scenario, sprat harvests declined under the NC
and the GC whereas herring and cod harvests increased. The NC
sprat and herring harvest changes were less than their GC harvest
changes while the GC cod harvest change was considerably higher
than the NC cod harvest change. In the second scenario, in
general, there were positive change in sprat harvest whereas,
herring and cod harvests decreased markedly. Also, as in the
first scenario, NC sprat and herring harvest changes were
smaller compared to their GC harvest changes (Figure 3 and
Supplementary Table S2).
Economic Output
The total payoffs of the GC clearly outperformed the NC case
across all scenarios (Table 2). Likewise, the payoffs for each
country separately were generally higher under GC, except for
Poland that showed a slightly higher net present value under
NC compare to GC for scenario 1 and 2 (Supplementary
Table S1).
If we compare payoffs between climate scenarios, scenario
1 yielded considerably higher total revenues compared to the
BS for both NC and GC, while scenario 2 demonstrated
considerably lower payoffs (Figure 4). For scenario 1, the
gains were equally distributed between countries, while for
scenario 2 Denmark show considerably lower payoffs compared
to Poland and Sweden. In the first scenario, the GC solutions
outperformed the NC case only for Denmark, whereas Poland
and Sweden did not get higher economic benefits by joining
the GC. In the second scenario, GC outperformed NC
only for Poland while Denmark and Sweden demonstrated
lower payoffs under GC compared to the base scenario
(Supplementary Figure S5).
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FIGURE 2 | Changes in total harvest of the countries in the non-cooperative
(NC) and the grand coalition (GC) games under climate scenarios [scenario 1
(S1): low temperature-high salinity; scenario 2 (S2): high temperature-low
salinity].
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TABLE 2 | Country level aggregated net present values (millions €) for the
non-cooperative (NC) and the grand coalition (GC) games under the three climate
scenarios considered.
Country Base scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2
NC GC NC GC NC GC
Denmark 2,444 2,684 2,358 2,985 1,955 1,955
Poland 747 735 903 889 646 663
Sweden 1,399 1,730 1,652 1,878 1,246 1,378
Total 4,590 5,149 4,913 5,753 3,847 3,996
Finally, we also assessed the economic performance of NC
and GC by sprat-herring and cod fleets separately. For the sprat-
herring fleets, the Danish and the Swedish sprat-herring fleets
were negatively impacted under the first scenario for both GC and
NC whereas the Polish sprat-herring fleet showed almost equal
payoffs compared to the BS under GC and NC (Figure 5). In the
second scenario, all sprat-herring fleets show higher payoffs
compared to the BS. For the Danish and the Swedish sprat-
herring fleet NC payoffs were found higher than the GC payoffs
in contrast to the Polish sprat-herring fleet. In general, the total
payoffs of the GC exceed the total payoffs of the NC in the first
scenario whereas, in the second scenario, the total NC payoff was
higher than the GC. For the cod fleets, the NC and GC payoffs
of the first scenario were higher compared to the BS and the
second scenario. In the first scenario, the GC payoff of the Danish
cod fleet surpassed the NC payoff whereas the NC payoffs of
the Polish and the Swedish cod fleets were higher than the GC
payoffs. Lastly, the first scenario total GC payoff was greater than
the total NC payoff. In the second scenario, the GC payoffs were
greater than the NC payoffs for all countries and the payoffs were
significantly lower than the BS.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we assessed the NC and GC payoffs for three
asymmetric countries that optimize their rents from Baltic Sea
cod, sprat and herring fisheries. In general, the GC payoffs were
found to be much higher than the NC payoffs. Both in the GC
and the NC games, Denmark is apparently the most profitable
country, especially regarding the cod fishery. The GC benefits of
Denmark is much higher than the benefits of Poland and Sweden
and, so that, to provide equal share of the excess benefits in the
GC, Denmark would pay compensation to Sweden and Poland
as it has the highest profit among countries (Nieminen et al.,
2016). Having said that, this would still be an issue of debate as
the profits of Sweden is as similar as the profits of Denmark.
The payoffs of all the sprat-herring fleets were highest in
the second scenario that is considered as favorable for sprat
recruitment due to high temperatures but unfavorable for cod
due to the low salinity levels (Lindegren et al., 2009). Hence,
this scenario resulted in higher recruitment and survival of
the sprat and herring stocks compared to cod and increased
economic returns of the sprat-herring fleets. On the contrary,
when the temperature is low and the salinity high, as in the
first scenario, cod is benefited and the conditions where the GC
payoffs are higher than the NC payoffs are better for Denmark
and Sweden because of mainly, Danish and Swedish fishery
is economically dependent on the cod fishery. These results
contrast with previous findings (except for Poland) that showed
weakened GC payoffs (Nieminen et al., 2016). Our results are in
line with previous finding by Brandt and Kronbak (2010) that
suggested lower cooperation or cooperative agreements with the
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negative impact on the resource rent. As mentioned in Nieminen
et al. (2016), the impact of fluctuated cod, herring or sprat
recruitment on fishery agreements would be better understood if
other species, as well as environmental conditions are considered
within the models.
Discount rate sensitivity of the NC model were found to be
substantial. Especially, the economic returns of the cod fleets
sharply increased with decreasing discount rates. In addition
to weighting future payoffs higher, the lower discount rates
also favor a more precautionary exploitation level allowing the
stock to rebuild to a higher level. This in turn significantly
increase long-term yields and reduce operating costs, as the
same yield can be achieved with lower effort (Döring and
Egelkraut, 2008; Lindegren et al., 2009). In contrast, a 100%
increase in the discount rate yielded much lower cod and herring
SSBs resulting in a considerably lower total net present value.
The GC cases also followed the similar trend in discount rate
sensitivity with relatively higher payoffs compared to the NC
case (Supplementary Table S3). The sensitivity of the fish prices
via 20% decrease or increase in prices resulted in very different
economic output, especially for the NC case. Such volatility in
payoffs due to changes in fish prices would not be wanted by
the fishermen or industry. However, the GC results for the same
price sensitivity intervals yielded much more positive output
compared to the NC results. So that, the GC case reduced
the price volatility compared to the NC case. Likewise, a 20%
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decrease or increase in costs also disproportionately decreased or
increased the final economic output (Supplementary Table S4).
But, the changes in the cost parameters did not affect the
economic output as much as the prices. Interestingly, in the
GC case, the countries, Denmark and Poland, did not get
much benefit from the decrease in cost parameters as these
countries in the GC were substantially lower compared to the NC
case. Having said that, increase in the cost parameters resulted
in relatively higher payoffs in the GC compared to the NC
(Supplementary Table S5). To summarize, the discount rate,
price and cost parameters’ sensitivity did have substantial impact
in the economic shares of the NC and GC games. So that, this
variation would likely to have additional increase or decreases in
compensation amounts that the dominant fishing nation would
likely to pay. So that, increase benefits with low discount or cost
and high price would not only be good for the dominant fishing
nation but also, good for the other fishing nations.
Policy Considerations
The recent reform of the EU-CFP states that “the CFP shall
ensure that fishing and aquaculture activities contribute to
long-term environmental, economic and social sustainability”
(European Council [EC], 2013). Quota allocation schemes, such
as TAC are commonly used around the world, including the
Baltic Sea. The precautionary principle, that emphasizes the
management of fish stocks within safe biological limits, has been
the basis of TACs allocations. However, EU has previously been
unsuccessful in meeting the precautionary approach, leading to
overexploitation of fish stocks, partly driven by overcapacity and
poor profitability of the fishing fleets. Consequently, costs and
benefits of the fleets should be considered when determining
the TAC. TAC allocation would be considered according to the
relative stability principle to be accepted by the all member
states. A sharing rule would be solution in sharing the resource
benefits. In the current study, the GC did not result in positive
returns for all the fishing states. For example, Poland (in all
scenarios) and Denmark (in scenario 2) received no, little or
negative economic outputs from the GC compared to the NC.
In this case, the countries that receive positive economic return
from the GC would compensate the countries that cannot yield
positive economic return. As a solution, Nash Bargaining equal
sharing rule could be useful to allocate the payoff increases
(Nash, 1953; see e.g., Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Li, 1998). The
allocation should be based on compensation schemes created
collaboratively in which the dominant fishing state would be
transferring surplus benefits to states with negative economic
returns. Further cooperation among the Baltic Sea states would
be inevitable, especially given the forecasted changes in fish
stocks expected under climate change (Lindegren et al., 2010;
MacKenzie et al., 2012; Bartolino et al., 2014; Blenckner et al.,
2015). Costs of measures on the mitigation of the climate change
would be provided by the surpass benefits. The area closure can
also be substantial tool for the management of the stocks.
CONCLUSION
The cooperative management once again demonstrated to be
fundamental in defining economically optimal use strategies for
shared fish resources. In our case, considering the multi-species
and multi-fleet nature of the fisheries, the effectiveness of the
cooperative approach would be essential in the decision-making
process. Furthermore, this effectiveness of the cooperation
was not only limited with the existing climate conditions
but also under changing climatic conditions that would be
mitigated with the cooperative agreements. Finally, it is essential
to increase the number of game theoretical studies focusing
on the biological and economic externalities under changing
environmental conditions.
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